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Rethinking the Equities of Federal Farm
Programs
CHRISTOPHER R. KELLEY*

'It reminds me of an old neighbor who farmed with mules,' says a
southern Corn Belt farmer. 'He had to raise hay for the mules;
and then because he grew hay, he needed the mules.' We're in the
same vicious circle today.

We farm for the government so the

government will pay us to farm.'

I. INTRODUCTION
Since the 1930's, the federal government has participated in the farm
economy by supporting commodity prices and farm income.2
The
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938,' the cornerstone of federal commodi* Partner, Lindquist & Vennum, P.L.L.P., Minneapolis, Minnesota. B.A., 1969,
Louisiana State University; J.D., 1975, Howard University; LL.M., 1986, University
of
Arkansas.
1. John Russnogle, $50,000 Limit Backs Off the Big Boys, FARM I., May 1987, at 24,
25. For a more detailed account of farming with mules, see generally WILLIAM FERRIS,

"You LIVE AND LEARN. THEN You DIE AND FORGET IT ALL": RAY LUM'S
TALES OF
HORSES, MULES AND MEN (1992).
2. See generally GEOFFREY S. BECKER, FUNDAMENTALS OF DOMESTIC COMMODITY

PRICE PROGRAMS (Cong. Research Serv. Rep. No. 86-128 ENR, 1986); DOUGLAS E. BOWERS
ET AL., HISTORY OF AGRICULTURAL PRICE-SUPPORT AND ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMS,
1933-84:
BACKGROUND FOR 1985 FARM LEGISLATION (U.S. Dep't Agric., Economic Research
Serv.,
Agric. Info. Bull. No. 485, 1984); JAMES S. WARD, FARM COMMODITY AND RELATED
PRO-

GRAMS (U.S. Dep't Agric., Agric. Stabilization & Conservation Serv., 1976); J.W. Looney,
The Changing Focus of Government Regulation of Agriculture in the United States,
44
MERCER L. REV. 763 (1993). Prior to October 13, 1994, the federal firm programs
were
administered by the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service ("ASCS"). Effective
October 13, 1994, the ASCS's functions were transferred to a new USDA agency,
the
Consolidated Farm Service Agency (CFSA). Federal Crop Insurance Reform and Department
of Agriculture Reorganization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-354, § 226, 108 Stat. 3178,
3214-16. For a discussion of how the ASCS administered the federal farm programs,
see
Christopher R. Kelley & John S. Harbison, A Guide to the ASCS Administrative Appeal
Process and to the Judicial Review of ASCS Decisions (pt. 1), 36 S.D. L. REV. 14, 15-23
(1991).
3. Pub. L. No. 75-430, ch. 30, 52 Stat. 31 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 7 U.S.C.).
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ty policy, offered a variety of justifications for federal intervention in the
farm economy. These included the need to conserve natural resources; to
and
develop domestic and export markets; to ensure an "orderly, adequate,
farm
balanced flow" of commodities through these markets; to provide
an "adequate and
income "parity;"'4 and to assist consumers in obtaining
'"5 Thus, at its inception,
steady supply of ... commodities at fair prices.
6
federal farm policy implicitly promised something for everyone. Congress
alike
assured conservationists, commodity traders, farmers, .and consumers
and
that they would all be7 beneficiaries of a policy designed to stabilize
income.
support farm
with that of
4. "Parity income is a comparison of the income of farm families
standard as
living
same
the
attain
families
farm
when
achieved
is
and
nonfarm families,

nonfarm families."

AND
LLOYD D. TEIGEN, AGRICULTURAL PARITY: HISTORICAL REVIEW

Serv., Agric.
ALTERNATIVE CALCULATIONS iii (U.S. Dep't Agric., Economic Research
to a unit of
convey
to
intended
is
price
parity
"A
Economic Report No. 571, June 1987).
1910-14
the
in
had
it
that
power
purchasing
same
the
wheat,
of
bushel
a
commodity, such as
farms
on
lived
who
base period." Id. The 1910-14 base period "was a time when people
Id. at
economy."
the
of
growth
were perceived as receiving a fair share of the income and
1-2.
leading to the
5. 7 U.S.C. § 1282 (1988). For a discussion of the circumstances
AMERICAN
FITE,
C.
enactment of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, see GILBERT
FARMERS: THE NEW MINORITY

(1984);

TitEODORE SALOUTOS. THE AMERICAN FARMER AND

in our national history,"
THE NEW DEAL (1982). As the first "omnibus law for agriculture
philosophy which
government'
'little
the
from
departure
clear
a
the Act "represented
Agricultural
characterized pre-Depression, rural-agrarian America." Harold F. Breimyer,
(1983).
350-51
333,
Philosophies and Policies in the New Deal, 68 MINN. L. REV.
this
6. In the 1930's, "everyone" was not an all-encompassing term. Consider
South:
the
in
programs
Deal
assessment of the effect of the New
and
It seem impossible to generalize briefly and fairly about New Deal agricultural
a fair
rural welfare programs. They brought both succor and suffering. Perhaps
white,
summary, subject to many exceptions, would be that in predominantly
but
relief
as
inadequate
were
programs
the
nonplantation areas in the South,
areas,
plantation
black
predominantly
In
run.
short
the
in
positive and beneficial
and inon the other hand, the programs rescued and enriched planter-landlords
landless.
and
poor
flicted frustration and suffering on the already
SOUTH 1920 - 1960 56 (1987);
JACK T. KIRBY, RURAL WORLDS LOST: THE AMERICAN
Perspective: The Economics of
Historical
in
Question
Land
The
Marable,
but see Manning
Poverty in the Blackbelt South, 1865 - 1920, in THE BLACK RURAL LANDOWNER
(Leo
19
3,
IMPLICATIONS
ECONOMIC
AND
SOCIAL, POLITICAL,
ENDANGERED SPECIES:
economy, it was
McGee & Robert Boone eds., 1979) ("Given the structure of the domestic
from their homes to
inevitable that black farmers would be forced off the land and evicted
of the North.").
ghettos
work at factory jobs in the cities of the New South and the urban
New Deal
Rasmussen,
D.
Wayne
7. See, e.g., Breimyer, supra note 5, at 349-50;
themes
("The
(1983)
358-59
353,
REV.
L.
MINN.
Agricultural Policies After Fifty Years, 68
in the
emphasized
were
demand
to
production
adjusting
and
of maintaining farm income
legislation
the
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938."). Two important notions underlying
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Six decades have passed since the enactment of the Agricultural
Adjustment Act of 1938, and it is safe to say that conservationists,
commodity traders, farmers, and consumers are not altogether satisfied with
the federal farm policy that has evolved from that Act.' Conservationists
question whether federal price and income support has done more harm than
good to the environment by promoting input-intensive, specialized
production practices and by discouraging the adoption of alternative crops
and cropping practices. 9 Commodity traders challenge the trade distorting
were that farmers would not be the only beneficiaries, and the programs were
to be
temporary:
[F]arm programs were an integral part of the New Deal political and social
movement. Because farming was such a significant portion of the economy at the
time - accounting for about 8 percent of the gross national product and employing
almost 20 percent of the total civilian labor force - restoring prosperity to
agriculture was seen as a first and important step toward revitalizing the national
economy.
Kristen Allen & Barbara J. Elliott, The Current Debate and Economic Rationale for
U.S.
Agricultural Policy, in U.S. AGRICULTURE IN A GLOBAL SETTING: AN AGENDA
FOR THE
FUTURE 9, 17-18 (M. Ann Tutwiler ed., 1988); see generally Gordon C. Rausser &
David
Nielson, Looking Ahead: Agricultural Policy in the 1990's, 23 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
415, 419
(1990) (noting "policymakers emphasized that the measures taken were not implemented
to
establish the foundational superstructure for a permanent policy of income support
for
agriculture").
8. Perhaps a certain amount of the dissatisfaction can be explained as ritualistic and
as an inevitable product of a policy with mixed purposes:
Farm groups, from the radical American Agriculture Movement to the rock-ribbed
conservative American Farm Bureau Federation, condemn federal agricultural
programs as a matter of ritual, and nearly every congressional hearing on
agriculture commences with a rendition of how horribly the government treats the
farmer. This is partly-because agricultural programs are a philosophical jumble.
Containing elements of free-market risk and federal bailouts, capitalist entrepreneurship and socialist central planning, they do not reinforce anyone's world view.
Gregg Easterbrook, Making Sense of Agriculture, THE ATLANTIC, July 1988, at 63,
65.
9. See, e.g., PAUL FAETH ET AL., PAYING THE FARM BILL: U.S. AGRICULTURAL

POLICY AND THE TRANSITION TO SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURE (1991);
NATIONAL RESEARCH
COUNCIL, ALTERNATIVE AGRICULTURE 65-85 (1989). The ecological

shortcomings of the
farm programs have been summarized as follows:
The farm programs support crops that tend to require high agrichemical inputs and
are associated with high rates of soil erosion. Other less-erosive and less-agrichemical-dependent crops receive little government support. The programs reward
farmers for specializing in program crops year after year, resulting in further soil
depletion and pest problems, which in turn lead to a greater need for agrichemical
inputs. The programs tend to discourage farmers from planting other crops and
from using more diversified crop rotations.

U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ALTERNATIVE AGRICULTURE:

FARMERS' OPTIONS 3 (Pub. No. PEMD-90-12, Feb. 1990).

FEDERAL INCENTIVES AND
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°
effects of government supported prices' and the production lost through
to3
acreage reduction programs." Farmers criticize the programs' failure
2 and the increasing complexity of the program rules.'
improve prices

FOR THE

10. E.g., AGRICULTURAL POLICY WORKING GROUP, AGRICULTURAL POLICY
Group includes
1990's (June 1989). The membership of the Agricultural Policy Working
traders,
commodity
other
and
Cargill, Inc.; Louis Dreyfus Corporation; Monsanto Company;
for
calls
policy
proposed
Group's
The
input suppliers, and transportation companies.
production.
from
"decoupling" program benefits
association
11. For example, the National Grain and Feed Association ("NGFA"), an
production
from
land
of
of grain handlers, shippers, and merchants, asserts that the removal
Program
Reserve
Conservation
the
through the Acreage Reduction Program ("ARP") and
of
States
United
the
by
foregone
production
grain
of
("CRP") has "led to a cumulative total
jobs
120,000
of
employment
"lost
to
equal
loss
production
a
tons,"
more than 350 million
FEED ASS'N, U.S.
and lost economic activity of $42 billion." NATIONAL GRAIN AND
July 1992, at
AGRICULTURE,
U.S.
FOR
PLAN
AGRICULTURE 2020: AN ECONOMIC GROWTH
as excessive
effect
"same
the
has
production
from
land
4. The NGFA argues that removing
costs;
increasing
needlessly
losses;
productivity
causing
by
tax
hidden
a
regulations or
Id.
agriculture."
of
sectors
limiting the use of resources; and damaging profitability in all
PerEconoinywide
An
Control:
Supply
See also Thomas W. Hertel, Gainers and Losers with
controls sufficient
spective, CHOICES, Fourth Quarter 1988, at 10 (estimating that "acreage
in a global
resulted
have
would
1984
in
10%
by
prices
cotton
and
to raise grain, oilseeds,
welfare loss of more than $11 billion").
influencing
12. The federal farm programs sometimes work at cross-purposes in
increase
and
supplies
control
to
designed
are
asides
"[slet
commodity prices. For example,
to
doing,
so
by
and
supply,
increase
to
farmers
induce
supports
price
but
market prices,
FARM
U.S.
IN
depress market prices." ROBBIN A. SHOEMAKER, A MODEL OF PARTICIPATION
No. 1819,
PROGRAMS 14 (U.S. Dep't Agric., Economic Research Serv., Technical Bulletin
words:
Aug. 1993). In other
Farm subsidies provide just enough money to keep nearly every farmer in business
farmers
producing just enough excess supply to hold prices down. This means that
prosperous
become
to
hard
who depend on government subsidies will find it
get
enough to do without them. It also means that farmers who aren't subsidized
but
works,
Everybody
subsidized.
was
one
no
if
would
lower prices than they
everybody is miserable.
is difficult to
Easterbrook, supra note 8, at 65. For a discussion of why price stabilization
Quest, in
Uncertain
An
Agriculture:
in
achieve, see James P. Houck, Stabilization
JAMES
also
see
1990);
ed.,
Allen
(Kristen
173
DECADE
NEW
A
AGRICULTURAL POLICIES IN
CONCENTRATHE
AND
EXPORTS
FARM
FUTURE:
THE
TRADING
HANTMAN,
WESSEL & MORT
since the New Deal has
TION OF ECONOMIC POWER IN OUR FOOD SYSTEM 29 ("Farm policy

mechanisms
continued to seek ways out of the farm problem that have only reinforced the
it.").
perpetuating
cost of
13. The complexity of federal farm programs not only adds to the financial
participation, it imposes other costs as well:
"It's a
A hidden cost in the program is the emotional toll it takes on farmers.
Southern
a
says
can't,"
some
and
strain
mental
the
with
monster. Some can cope
who are
farmer and county ASCS committee chairman. "These are good people
accepted
be
will
it
trying to stay within the rules. But they worry about whether
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Consumers, as taxpayers, question the cost to the federal treasury of income
14
transfers to farmers.
Criticism of the federal farm programs is not new. The federal farm
programs have withstood years of criticism. 5 Yet, perhaps more so now
than ever, the prospects for the current programs' long-term continuation are

or if it's against the law. There's no way of measuring what that does to a
person."
Russnogle, supra note 1, at 26.
14. Income transfers to farmers ranged from $4.6 billion to $16.7 billion from 1984
through 1989. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No. AFMD-9105, FINANCIAL AUDIT:
COMMODITY CREDIT CORPORATION'S FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR 1989 AND 1988 9 (1991).
Total program expenditures, including price support loans and other costs, were higher, exceeding $26 billion in 1986 and $22 billion in 1987. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB.
No. RCED-88-144FS, FARM PROGRAMS: PRICE AND INCOME SUPPORT PROGRAMS FOR
FISCAL YEARS 1987-89 7 (1988). During fiscal years 1982 through 1988, when program
costs were exceptionally high, farm program outlays constituted 1.8% of all federal expenditures. For four of those years, "the farm program share of federal outlays exceeded the farm
sectors [sic] contribution to gross national product . . . probably the first time that more
money was spent on farm programs by the public (i.e., the general economy) than farmers
contributed to the general economy." Carl Zulauf et al., Federal Expendituresfor Farn Programs: A Historical Picture Since 1950, CHOICES, Fourth Quarter 1989, at 32.
Of course, consumers are also concerned about food prices, nutrition, food safety,
and other issues having varying degrees of relevance to the commodity programs. See, e.g.,
Carol S. Kramer, Consumer Demands: A Balancing Act, il U.S. AGRICULTURE IN A GLOBAL
SETTING: AN AGENDA FOR THE FUTURE 105 (M. Ann Tutwiler ed., 1988).
15. "Whether intentional or not, the general form of the commodity policies
implemented in the 1930's has proven difficult to dismantle and has taken on the appearance
of a permanent fixture." Rausser & Nielson, supra note 7, at 419. One explanation for this
is that we cannot afford to end them:
During more than half a century, the commodity programs have been built into
land values, mortgaged indebtedness, living levels, community services, and
expectations. Their abrupt termination would be exceedingly harsh to many
individuals and communities. Even some who regret that the programs have
continued are reluctant to terminate them. Some say we have passed the point of
no return. Perhaps the main reason for continuing them is the undoubted pain of
their discontinuance. We are hooked on them; they are a form of addiction.
Don Paarlberg, Sources and Uses of Agriculture's Political Power, 37 DRAKE L. REV. 175,
180 (1987-88); see also C. Ford Runge, Economic iplicationsof Wider Compensationfor
"Takings" or, What If Agricultural Policies Ruled the World?, 17 VT. L. REV. 723, 737-38
(1993).
The overall effect of these subsidies is to create a system of entitlements
in which it is expected, even demanded, that government continue to regulate the agricultural sector ....
Given the rent seeking behavior of the
powerful commodity groups, the only check on such spending in recent
years has been general budget deficits.
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uncertain. The reasons for that uncertainty are numerous, and they arise
from forces operating both within and without the agricultural sector.
Stated broadly, the external forces working against the programs' longterm continuation include the nation's increasing urbanization6 and the
attendant loss of political support for commodity programs.1 Federal
budgetary constraints and demands to use available funds to meet needs
other than supporting farm income will continue to lead to a reduction in
7
income transfers to farmers. For example, the freezing of program crop
18
yields in the 1985 farm bill, the "triple-base option" in the Omnibus
9
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990,' and Congress' more recent refusal to
16. See, e.g., William P. Browne, The Fragmented and Meandering Politics of

Agriculture, in U.S.

AGRICULTURE IN A GLOBAL SETTING:

AN AGENDA FOR THE FUTURE

136 (M. Ann Tutwiler ed., 1988). At least one commentator does not agree with the notion
that the decline in the number of farmers necessarily means a loss in political power:
[A]s farmers grow fewer in number, a legislature favorable to farmers can afford
to be more generous to each one. There are a few more than two million farms.
A farm program cost of $23 billion means ... an average of about $10,000 for
each farm. It is highly unlikely that such a great per-farm benefit could be
supplied if there were six million farmers, as there were when I was a boy.
Paarlberg, supra note 15, at 179. As an illustration of the continuing political force of
farmers, consider the following account of a discussion between Alice Rivlin, then deputy
budget director, and President Clinton:
"Mr. President," Rivlin said enthusiastically, "I've got a slogan for your
reelection." Taking off on his campaign promise to "end welfare as we know it,"
she proposed: "'I'm going to end welfare as we know it for farmers."'
Clinton stiffened, looked at her, and snapped, "Spoken like a true city
dweller." The former governor of Arkansas leaned across the table dramatically
in her direction and added, "Farmers are good people. I know we have to do these
things. We're going to make these cuts. But we don't have to feel good about it."
BOB WOODWARD, THE AGENDA

127-28 (1994).

17. See generally James D. Schaub & Daniel A. Sumner, The Deficit and Agriculture,
CHOICES, First Quarter 1993, at 10, I1, 32 (based on estimated fiscal 1993 farm program
outlays of $17 billion, "completely eliminating CCC outlays would at best reduce the
projected 1993 deficit by 5 percent assuming no increase in other federal outlays or decrease
in federal receipts as a consequence of the program elimination").
18. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1465-1466 (1988 & Supp. III 1991); see generally THOMAS W.
HERTAL ET AL., AN ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT OF THE FREEZE ON PROGRAM YIELDS

(1990). Under the 1985 and 1990 farm bills, farmers' yields were frozen based on their 198185 levels so that farmers could not receive higher payments by increasing yields. In practical
terms, the freezing of yields has reduced payments because farmers' actual yields have
continued to increase. For example, in 1992, actual wheat yields averaged 39.4 bushels per
acre while program yields averaged only 34.4 bushels per acre. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, PUB: NO. RCED-93-175BR, WHEAT COMMODITY PROGRAM: IMPACT ON PRODUCERS' INCOME 35-36 (1993).
19. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 1441-2(c)(1)(C), 1444-2(c)(1)(C), 1444f(c)(I)(C), 1445b-3a(c)(l)(C), 1464 (dealing with rice, upland cotton, feed grains, and wheat); see generally
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continue funding of the wool, mohair, and honey programs 2° reflect the
farm programs' increasing vulnerability to competing demands for federal
funds.
Even in the competition for funds for rural America, farmers will not
necessarily prevail. The linkage between farmer prosperity and the
economic well-being of rural America is increasingly being questioned.21
"Agriculture is no longer the major source of employment in rural America,
and it is no longer the major source of income for the majority of farmers." 22 As the relative economic significance of agricultural production
continues to decline in rural counties, strategies to promote rural development are less likely to continue to be premised on transferring income to farnersY2

CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, U.S. CONGRESS, FARM PROGRAM FLEXIBILITY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE TRIPLE BASE OPTION (1989).

20. Pub. L. No. 103-130, § 3(c), 107Stat. 1369 (1993).
21. E.g., Jackie Salsgiver, Counties with High Percent of Ag Jobs Decline, AGRIC.
OUTLOOK, Nov. 1993, at 31. The author notes that by 1990, only 27% of U.S. counties had
at least 25% of their total employment in farming and its closely related industries. In 1975,
that figure was 47%. Id. See also Kenneth L. Deavers, 1980's A Decade of Broad Rural
Stress, RURAL DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES 2, 5 (1991) ("The weak connection between
farming activity and rural community vitality, between farm family and farm business success
and the well-being of most rural people, between natural resource production generally and
rural development, means we need a'new paradigm for future rural economic development.").
22. Karl N. Stauber, The Diversity of Rural America, AGRIC. OUTLOOK, Jan.-Feb.
1994, at 23. Preliminary estimates of farm operator income in 1992 show an average income
of $40,068, with almost 90% coming from off-farm sources. Even "commercial" farms with
gross farm sales of at least $50,000 depend heavily on off-farm income:
The 54 percent of farm operator households in the group of viable commercial
farms are viable because of their success in off-farm occupations. These
households lost an average of $817 farming in 1992, but their off-farm income
brought average household income to over $50,000.
Janet Perry & Bob Hoppe, Off-Farm Income Plays Pivotal Role, AGRIC. OUTLOOK, Nov.
1993, at 3, 4. See also MARGARET A. BUTLER, THE FARM ENTREPRENEURIAL POPULATION,
1988-90 (U.S. Dep't Agric., Economic Research Serv., Rural Development Res. Rep. No. 84,
1993).
23. The following expresses what is becoming the prevailing sentiment:
The myth of rural dependence on farming is not only inconsistent with the
socioeconomic realities of most rural areas; it also serves as an obstacle to the
emergence of nonfarm rural development programs. Continuing the myth affords
legitimacy to commodity programs that have little impact on most rural people.
It also hides or plays down the existing transformation of the rural economy and
society. The trailer park and the manufacturing plant are more characteristic of
rural people's lives and livelihood than are family farms. To the extent that a large
population of farm families rely on off-farm income, we are now missing the best
opportunity for helping that plurality by facilitating the development of more viable
nonfarm rural economies. What we urge is a simple understanding: farm policy
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Public support for new environmental initiatives will add to the
programs' vulnerability. Traditional farm programs are no longer universal24
ly viewed as the most desirable means of achieving environmental goals.
Many believe that instead of conditioning eligibility for farm program
payments on compliance with rules designed to promote soil and wetland
conservation,' such requirements should be made freestanding and
applicable to all farmers.26
The trend toward a "global marketplace"" and the related international
trade arrangements, such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
("GATT"), will add to the pressure to reduce or restructure the federal

2
government's financial support of agricultural interests. " Significantly, the

demands to reduce the commodity program's negative effects on the nation's
competitiveness in international markets have come largely from groups
within the agricultural sector, particularly those who handle and market
program commodities.29 These pressures and demands have already
should be taken for what it is, namely, industrial policy with some economic
benefits for farmers and their industrial partners.
WILLIAM P. BROWNE ET AL., SACRED COWS AND HOT POTATOES: AGRARIAN MYTHS
AGRICULTURAL POLICY 35

IN

(1992).

24. Some of the dissatisfaction with attempting to achieve environmental goals through
the federal farm programs is based on the perception that the Department of Agriculture has
been "either unwilling or unable to vigorously enforqe the law." Anthony N. Turrini,
Swampbuster: A Report from the Front, 24 IND. L. REV. 1507, 1524 (1991).
25. See 16 U.S.C. § 3811 (1988 & Supp. Ill 1991). See generally Linda A. Malone,
Reflections on the Jeffersonian Ideal of an Agrarian Democracy and the Emergence of an
Agricultural and Environmental Ethic in the 1990 Farm Bill, 12 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3 (1993).
26. See generally Tim Osborn et al., U.S. Conservation Policy - What's Ahead?,
Protection and
AGRIC. OUTLOOK, Nov. 1993, at 36; Katherine Reichelderfer, Environmental
INA NEW
POLICIES
Agricultural Support: Are Trade-offs Necessary?, in AGRICULTURAL
DECADE 201 (Kristen Allen ed., 1990).
27. See Ray A'. Goldberg, New International Linkages Shaping the U.S. Food System,
isolated
CHOICES, Fourth Quarter 1993, at 15, 17 (noting that "farmers have been the most
sector in the global farm system").
28. See, e.g., David Blandford, U.S. Trade Policy and the GATT: Implications for
Agriculture, in AGRICULTURAL POLICIES IN A NEW DECADE 285 (Kristen Allen ed., 1990);
H. WAYNE MOYER & TIMOTHY E. JOSLING, AGRICULTURAL POLICY REFORM: POLITICS AND
PROCESS IN THE EC AND USA (1990); M. Ann Tutwiler & Barbara J. Elliott, An Interdependent and Fragile Global Economy, in U.S. AGRICULTURE IN A GLOBAL SETTING: AN
Future
AGENDA FOR THE FUTURE 49 (M. Ann Tutwiler ed., 1988); J.W. Looney, GATT and
TULSA
28
Australia,
from
Lessons
Some
States:
United
the
in
Programs
Soil Conservation
L.J. 673 (1993).
29. See, e.g., Alan Barkema et al., The Competitiveness of U.S. Agriculture in the
1990's, in AGRICULTURAL POLICIES IN A NEW DECADE 253 (Kristen Allen ed., 1990);
WILLARD W. COCHRANE & C. FORD RUNGE, REFORMING FARM POLICY:
NATIONAL AGENDA 83-84 (1992).

TOWARD A
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reduced the role of farm programs in the production decisions for corn,
wheat, rice, and upland cotton, and farm programs have become more

market-oriented through reductions in "payment acres," or base-acreage
eligible for program payments.3

Emerging technologies, especially developments in biotechnology, also
may reduce the economic significance of existing farm programs.3
Biotechnology is likely to lead to more exclusive reliance on private
contractual arrangements for the production and sale of crops now supported
by the federal commodity programs and sold on public markets.32 Over
time, this reliance on private contracts and the associated trend toward more
vertical integration throughout agriculture may be among the primary forces
leading to the demise of traditional commodity programs.33 The integra-

30. See PAUL C. WESTCOTr, MARKET-ORIENTED AGRICULTURE: THE DECLINING
ROLE OF GOVERNMENT COMMODITY PROGRAMS INAGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION DECISIONS
(U.S. Dep't Agric., Economic Research Serv., Agric. Econ. Rep. No. 671, 1993); see also
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No. RCED-94-76, COMMODITY PROGRAMS: FLEX
ACRES ENHANCE FARM OPERATIONS AND MARKET ORIENTATION 7

(1993) ("Because normal

flex acres-as well as optional flex acres used for alternative crops-are not eligible for
deficiency payments, farmers are more apt to plant crops in response to the market than to
grow crops in response to government programs as farmers have done in the past."). For a
discussion of the reduction of "payment acres" under the triple-base option, see infra note
45, and see also Looney, supra note.2, at 75.
31. See generally OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, PUB. No.
OTA-F-474, A NEW TECHNOLOGICAL ERA FOR AMERICAN AGRICULTURE (1992).
32. Biotechnology and the "industrialization" of agriculture are closely linked, and
biotechnology is contributing to the trend toward the industrialization of agricultural
production:
[A]n industrialized system will-and is-adopting at a much more rapid rate than
the individual producer. Molecular biology now allows industrial enterprises to
plan and develop identity-preserved grains and oilseeds. Traditional technology
transfer processes between researchers and farmers cannot compete with an
industrialized system. The autonomous farmer has neither access to all the
elements of the system nor the management skills to organize all elements. Ongoing changes in hog production today illustrate the case; grains and oilseeds are
following.
Thomas N. Urban, Agricultural Industrialization: It's Inevitable, CHOICES, Fourth Quarter
1991, at 5. "Production agriculture in the Western World is now entering the last phase of
industrialization-the integration of each step in the food production system. The production
segment is rapidly becoming part of an industrialized food system." Id. at 4. See also Neil
D. Hamilton, Feeding Our Future: Six Philosophical Issues Shaping Agricultural Law, 72
NEB. L. REV. 210, 213-18 (1993).

33. See Hamilton, supra note 32, at 213-14; John Ikerd, Policy and Sustainable

Agriculture, AGRIC. OUTLOOK, Feb. 1993, at 14 (noting that "public policies have helped
make U.S. agriculture more 'efficient' through a process of industrialization").
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tion of production agriculture into the processing and marketing phases of
food and fiber production is expanding the "industrialization" of agriculture,
and this expansion:
will have a significant long-term effect on farm policy. The
farmers' safety net, or risk sharing, will come to depend as much on
their link to an industrialized system as on federal farm programs.
The rationalization for a public system to protect the independent
commodity producer-the family farmer-will begin to erode. Such
farm
a turn of events will require significant rethinking of our 34
policy agenda and a further. rationalization for its continuance.
Finally, farmer dissatisfaction and frustration with the federal farm
35 Although participation
programs may erode participation and support.
36
rates remain relatively high, farmer dissatisfaction with the costs in time
and money incurred as a result of program participation has increased as the
program rules have become more complex. While much attention has been
paid to achieving social, economic, and environmental goals through federal
commodity programs, very little effort has been made to reduce or simplify
program rules.37
34. Urban, supra note 32, at 6.
35. "Today, less than three-fourths of the participants' production is covered by the
programs," thus reducing the incentives to participate. Henry W. Ayer, An Interview with
John Lee, Jr., CHOICES, Fourth Quarter 1993, at 9, 10. John Lee, Jr., was the administrator
of the USDA's Economic Research Service from 1991 until mid-1993. Mr. Lee's
observation assumes an ARP or "set aside" of 10%.
36. Since 1988, from 78% to 87% of the wheat base, 94% to 96% of the rice base,
76% to 87% of the corn base, 70% to 82% of the sorghum base, 67% to 82% of the barley
base, 9% to 46% of the oats base, and 84% to 90% of the upland cotton base has been enrolled in the farm programs. Economic Research Scrv., U.S. Dep't Agric., Statistical
Indicators, Crops and Products, AGRIC. OUTLOOK, Jan.-Feb. 1994, at 48.
37. Complexity spawns litigation. For discussions of federal farm program litigation,
see generally Alice Devine, Understanding the Current Crisis with the ASCS, 9 J. AGRIC.
TAX'N & L. 195 (1987); Neil D. Hamilton, Legal Issues Arising in Federal Court Appeals
ofASCS DecisionsAdministering Federal Farm Programs,12 HAMLINE L. REV. 633 (1989);
Neil D. Hamilton, Farmers' Rights to Appeal ASCS Decisions Denying Farm Program
Benefits, 29 S.D. L. REV. 282 (1984); Christopher R. Kelley & John S. Harbison, A Guide
to the ASCS Administrative Appeal Process and to the Judicial Review of ASCS Decisions,
(Part 2: The Judicial Review of ASCS Decisions), 36 S.D. L. REV. 435 (1991); Ralph A.
Linden, An Overview of the Commodity Credit Corporationand the Procedures and Risks
of Litigating Against It, II J. AGRIC. TAX'N & L. 305 (1990); Alan R. Malasky et al.,
Resolving Federal Far'n Program Disputes: Recent Developments, 19 WM. MITCI1ELL L.
REV. 283 (1993); Alan R. Malasky, ASCS Appeals and Payment Limitation Revisions in the
1990 Farm Bill: What Did the American FarnerReally Gain (Or Lose)?, 68 N.D. L. REV.
365 (1992); Alexander J. Pires, Jr., Why the U.S. Clains Court is Not a Viable Venue for
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To the contrary, the trend has been to increase the transaction and
opportunity costs of federal farm program participation, a trend largely
brought about by the efforts of those who desire to limit program eligibility
through "means testing" and payment limits.3"
II. A PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE
Recognizing that the long-term prospects for the continuation of the
current price and income support programs are uncertain does not mean that
the notion of public investment in agriculture should be dismissed. It does
mean, however, that a new consensus must be formed if income transfers to
farmers are going to survive. In other words, farm programs must be able
to demonstrate their relevance and value to the American people.
This article maintains that, to be relevant and valuable to the American
people, the federal commodity programs should be reformed. It agrees with
the assertion that "[m]ore than anything else, agriculture would best be
served through comprehensive policy reform that restores a common sense
of direction to government's support of the food and fiber system." 39
Whether reformed or not, however, any policy that transfers income to
farmers presents three fundamental questions: why should income be
transferred to farmers; who should receive the income; and how much
should an individual farmer be permitted to receive. These questions
address the equities of income transfers.
This article answers these questions by asserting that the equities that
matter are those between the American farmer and the American public. It
proposes compensating farmers for the otherwise uncompensated benefits
they provide to the public, and it rejects the notion that federal farm policy
should transfer income to farmers based on their socioeconomic status. So
long as the American public receives benefits commensurate with its
Farmers: The U.S. Claims Court's Handling of Agricultural Cases, 1980-1990, 15 U. ARK.
LrrrLE ROCK L. J. 223 (1993); Alexander J. Pires, Jr. & Shelley L. Bagoly, Federal Court
Jurisdictionover USDAIASCS Cases: How and In What Courts FarnersCan Seek Review
of USDA Denials of Their Farm Subsidy Payments, 24 IND. L. REV. 1489 (1991).
38. See generally J.W. Looney & Lonnie R. Beard, Farm Business Planning:
CoordinatingFarn Program Payment Rules with Tax Law, 57 UM KC L. REV. 157 (1989)
("The restructuring of farm business operations to comply with farm program payment rules
and, at the same time, to avoid certain payment restrictions has become, in some areas, what
has been described as 'a booming new business for rural barristers' and a 'welfare program
for lawyers."').
39. William P. Browne, Agricultural Policy Can't Accommodate All Who Want In,
CHOICES, First Quarter 1989, at 9, 11 ("Agricultural policy cannot be all things to all people
and even pretend to address the development and maintenance of an internationally
competitive U.S. agriculture.").
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investments in American agriculture, farm program participants should not
be "means tested" or otherwise given income transfers based on their
socioeconomic status.
A.

THE CURRENT DISTRIBUTION OF PROGRAM PAYMENTS

Although this article proposes redesigning and redirecting federal farm
policy, the current mechanisms for transferring income to farmers provide
a perspective for examining the issues raised by income transfers to farmers.
Three points can be derived from that examination. First, current programs
favor moderate to large-scale farmers. These farmers are mostly family
farmers; they have a greater influence on commodity production than do
smaller-scale farmers; and, compared to their commodity sales, they receive
a smaller portion of the total program payments than do smaller-scale
farmers.
Second, the current programs favor larger farmers because payments are
based on production. The more "base acres" available to a farmer, the more
payments are available. While the current programs are based on production
so that commodity supplies can be controlled, the programs implicitly
acknowledge that what farmers do with their land is what matters if the
programs are to serve any function other than income maintenance.
Although it is questionable whether the current programs have promoted
environmentally responsible land stewardship, the current programs at least
recognize the predominating significance of land use.
Finally, efforts have been made to reduce the programs' favoritism
toward larger farmers. However, the current programs' attempt to limit
payments and to direct payments to farmers based on their economic status
are counterproductive, inefficient, and ineffective. Federal farm programs
simply do not work well as welfare programs. Given the diversity among
farms and farmers, the unpredictable nature of crop production, and the
variability in commodity markets, farm programs probably could never be
designed to be fair and efficient welfare programs for the truly "deserving"
farmer.
1.

The Current Programs Favor Larger Farmers

Currently, the primary mechanism for transferring income to farmers
is through deficiency payments.40 Income support is also provided through
40. Deficiency payments are direct payments to participating producers of feed grains
(corn, sorghum, oats, and barley), wheat, rice, and upland cotton. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1444f(c),
1445b-3a(c), 1441-2(c), 1444-2(c) (Supp. III 1991). The payment rate is a per-commodity
unit rate based on the difference between the target price and the averaged market price or
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permanent and special disaster assistance programs.4 Other programs
through which farmers receive payments, such as the Conservation Reserve
Program ("CRP") 42 and the Wetland Reserve Program ("WRP"), 43 are
usually characterized as conservation programs notwithstanding their income
support functions."
Deficiency payments and disaster payments are "coupled" to produc4
tion. 5 As a result, the programs favor the owners and operators of larger
farms.46 From 1985 through 1988, the largest percentage of payments,
about 37%, went to farms in the $100,000 to $249,000 sales class,
representing about 26% of all farms operating in that period.47 In 1987,
the loan rate, whichever difference is less. Id. To participate in the deficiency program, a

producer may have to set aside land, idling it from production. Under this set-aside
requirement, known as the acreage reduction program ("ARP"), the idled land must be put
into conservation uses ("CU"), also known as the acreage conservation reserve ("ACR"). See
7 C.F.R. §§ 1413.51, 1413.54, 1413.60-1413.72 (1993). For a discussion of the genesis of
the target price concept, see Claude T. Coffman, Target Prices, Deficiency Payment, and the
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973, 50 N.D. L. REV. 299 (1974).
41. For a discussion of the Disaster Assistance Act of 1988, which has been extended
each year since then, see infra notes 101-06 and accompanying text.
42. 16 U.S.C. §§ 3831-3836 (1988 & Supp. Il 1991).
43. 16 U.S.C. § 3837-3837(f). See generally MARC CARY ET AL., A PERMANENT
WETLAND RESERVE:

ANALYSIS OF A NEW APPROACH TO WETLAND PROTECTION (U.S.

Dep't of Agric., Economic Research Serv., Agric. Info. Bull. No. 610, 1990).
44. See Linda A. Malone, A Historical Essay on the Conservation Provisions of the
1985 Farm Bill: Sodbusting, Swanipbusting, and the Conservation Reserve, 34 KAN.L. REV.
577 (1986). Whether the CRP has done better transferring income than conserving highly
erodible land is debatable. See generally U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No. RCED93-132. CONSERVATION RESERVE PROGRAM: CosT-EFFECTIVENESS IS UNCERTAIN (1992).
45. Deficiency payments are not paid on the basis of actual production. Instead, they
are based on the producer's "base acres" minus the producer's ACR acres. See 7 U.S.C. §
1463 (Supp. III 1991). The resulting "permitted acres" are then multiplied by the program
yield to determine program production. Program production is the quantity eligible for
deficiency payments when the producer plants the maximum permitted acres. See 7 C.F.R.
§ 1413.108(d) (1993). Under the current payment acres and associated planting flexibility
provisions, the maximum acreage allowable for payment is now 85% of the crop acreage
base established for the crop, minus acreage idled under the ARP. The net effect of the
"nonpayment acres" is a 15% reduction in potential deficiency payments. See supra note 30.
46. More precisely, "[m]ost of the ultimate benefit from farm programs has gone to
owners of farmland or other resources in inelastic supply." Daniel A. Sumner, Targeting and
the Distribution of Program Benefits, in AGRICULTURAL POLICIES IN A NEW DECADE 125,
127 (Kristen Allen ed., 1990). As a group, landowners are major beneficiaries of federal
farm program payments because the payments are capitalized into land values. ROBBIN
SHOEMAKER ET AL., U.S. FARM PROGRAMS AND AGRICULTURAL RESOURCES 4 (U.S. Dep't
Agric., Economic Research Serv., Agric. Info. Bull. No. 614, 1990).
47. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No. RCED-90-108BR, FARMING AND FARM
PROGRAMS: IMPACT ON THE RURAL ECONOMY AND ON FARMERS 16 (1990) [hereinafter
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the farms in that class received payments averaging $26,959.48 The same
year, the 8.3% of farms in the $250,000 to $499,000 sales class received
4
about 21.3% of the payments, with payments averaging $46,416. ' The
25.4% of farms having sales between $10,000 to $39,999 received only
8.9% all payments, averaging $6,305.50 The 2.7% of farms with sales
$500,000 or over received 10.2% of the payments, at an average payment
of $68,705."'
2.

Most Payments Are Received by Family Farmers

The favoring of larger farms does not mean that payments are not
going to family farmers. 52 In 1987, for example, "[a]lmost all the operations in the larger sales categories [were] family farms in the sense that they
[were] owned and operated by a single family or a small group of related
members of one extended family and not by unrelated shareholders and
hired managers., 53 Also, those who are favored by the current programs
produce most of the commodity sales while receiving a smaller share of
program payments. In 1987, the farms in the sales classes over $100,000
Farming and Farm Programs].
48. Id. at 32.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. For a discussion of the characteristics of farms with annual product sales of
$500,000 or more in 1987, see generally DONN A. REIMUND & JUDITH Z. KALBACHER,
CHARACTERISTICS OF LARGE-SCALE FARMS, 1987 (U.S. Dep't Agric., Economic Research
Serv., Agric. Info. Bull. No. 668, 1993).
52. Some resist the notion that large family farms are family farms:
The problem is that very large and very small family operations are not the farms
[Flarms with gross annual sales of over
usually considered as family farms ....
owned and operated by a single
usually
not
are
two hundred thousand dollars
family; they are normally controlled by a corporation, operated by a farm
management firm, and worked by hired labor.
Gary Comstock, Introduction to Is THERE A MORAL OBLIGATION To SAVE THE FAMILY
FARM? xxiv (Gary Comstock ed., 1987). In addition to using "smallness" as an indicator of
a "family farmer," some consciously or unconsciously include humility. For example, the
following passage begins a chapter entitled "Family Farmer" in a book profiling three
American farms:
Joe Weisshaar's wife says she was first attracted to him because he was lowly. It's
a modest agrarian virtue, an ask-no-favorsi sturdy, bullish, and Rotarian thing to
be, a fine, German-Catholic, almost Christmassy trait. "I was impressed when he
first started to pay attention to me," Mary Jane Weisshaar explains, "by how
humble, how lowly he was in church."

MARK KRAMER, THREE FARMS: MAKING MILK, MEAT, AND MONEY FROM THE AMERICAN

SOIL 111 (1987).
53. Sumner, supra note 46, at 131.
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accounted for 73% of all program crop sales, but they received only 67%
of all program payments. The farms in the sales classes under $100,000
accounted for only 27% of all program crop sales but received 31% of all
program payments.54 Thus, the share of program payments received by
small farms is greater than their share of crop sales.55
3.

Payment Limits are Misguided and Inefficient

The favoring of larger farmers is mitigated to an extent by payment
limits. The current payment limitations scheme essentially serves three
functions.5 6 First, it limits the amount of commodity program payments a
"person" can receive in a crop year or other comparable period. This
function is accomplished by dollar limits on specified program payments and
by placing an overall $250,000 limit on all payments that are subject to a
limit.57 The most commonly encountered limit is the $50,000 limit on
deficiency payments."
The second function performed by the current payment limitations
scheme is limiting eligibility for most program payments to "persons" who
are "actively engaged in farming." 59 The basic idea underlying this function
is to deny payments to "passive" investors whose only participation in the
farming operation is the contribution of capital made with the expectation
it will be repaid by program payments. While the basic idea underlying the
"person" and "actively engaged in farming" requirements is straightforward,
the rules are not.
To be a separate "person" under the payment limitation rules, the
"person" seeking a payment limit separate from any other "person" must

54. Id. at 131-32.
55. For a discussion of the distribution of payments 10 years earlier, see WILLIAM

ET AL., FARM COMMODITY PROGRAMS:

LIN
WHO PARTICIPATES AND WHO BENEFITS? (U.S.

Dep't Agric., Economic Research Serv., Agric. Econ. Rep. No. 474, 1981). Discussions of
the distribution of farm program payments are numerous. See generally U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No.

RCED-93-175BR,

WHEAT COMMODITY PROGRAM: IMPACT

ON PRODUCERS' INCOME (1993); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No. RCED-92163FS, AGRICULTURE PAYMENTS: NUMBER OF INDIVIDUALS RECEIVING 1990 DEFICIENCY
PAYMENTS AND THE AMOUNTS (1993); Economic Research Serv., U.S. Dep't Agric., Farm
Commodity Programs and Their Effects, NATIONAL FOOD REV., Jan.-Mar. 1990, at 2.

56. For a more extensive discussion of the payment limitations rules and functions, see
generally Christopher R. Kelley & Alan R. Malasky, Federal Farm Program Payment-Linitations Law: A Lawyer's Guide, 17 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 199 (1991).

57. 7 U.S.C. § 1308(2) (1988). See also Kelley & Malasky, siqra note 56, at 215-23.
58. 7 U.S.C. § 1308(1) (1988).
59. 7 U.S.C. § 1308-1(b)(1) (1988). See also Kelley & Malasky, supra note 56, at
223-55.
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'have a "separate and distinct interest in the land or crop involved," must
[e]xercise separate responsibility for that interest," and must "[m]aintain
funds or accounts separate from that of any other individual or entity for
that interest."' To receive payments as a separate "person," the "person"
must be "actively engaged in farming," which generally requires the
contribution of land, equipment, or capital and labor or management to the
farming operation, with all contributions being commensurate with the
"person's" claimed share of the profits and losses of the operation and at
risk.'
A number of other rules require the combination of certain "persons"
into one "person" for program payment purposes, such as the combination
of an individual and a corporation when the individual owns more than a
62
fifty percent interest in the corporation receiving program payments. All
in all, the "person" and "actively engaged in farming" rules are so complex
and arcane that relatively few farmers and program administrators completely understand them.63
The current payment limitations scheme's third function is limiting the
number of entities through which an individual may receive payments. This
function, embodied in the "three-entity rule," prevents an individual who
receives program payments as an individual "person" from receiving
payments from more than two entities. 6' Stated differently, the "threeentity rule" essentially allows an individual to double the effective payment
limit because it permits an individual to receive one $50,000 limit as an
individual "person" and as a fifty percent shareholder in two corporations
also qualifying as "persons" ($50,000 + $25,000 + $25,000 = $100,000).
The "three-entity rule" is an implicit acknowledgment that the $50,000 limit
65
is too low for the efficient production of certain commodities.

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

317-30.

7 C.F.R. § 1497.3 (1993). See also Kelley & Malasky, supra note 56, at 255-78.
See 7 C.F.R. § 1497.201 (1993).
See 7 C.F.R. §§ 1497.101-1497.107 (1993).
See Kelley & Malasky, supra note 56, at 206.
7 U.S.C. § 1308-1(a)(1) (1988). See also Kelley & Malasky, supra note 56, at

65. See Kelley & Malasky, supra note 56, at 206-07. Of course, there are political
motivations for the three-entity rule, as there are for all of the payment limitation rules. See,
e.g., David S. Cloud, Farm Bloc on the Defensive As Bills Move to Floor: Assault on
Payments to Nation's Biggest Operators Could Alter Bond Between Congress and Farmers,
48 CONG. Q. 2209 (1990). The budget savings resulting from program payment limits has
been minimal, largely because the limits can be avoided through farm reorganizations. See,
e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. NO. RCED-92-2, AGRICULTURE PAYMENTS:
EFFECTIVENESS OF EFFORTS TO REDUCE FARM PAYMENTS HAS BEEN LIMITED (1991).
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The current payment limitation scheme, particularly its "three-entity
rule," does not satisfy some who believe that all income transfers to farmers
should be "targeted" to small, family farmers or financially distressed
farmers. 66 Those who favor "targeting" explicitly or implicitly argue that
the programs are (or should be) exclusively income maintenance programs,
and those who need the income should be favored. 67 Thus, incorporated
into the questions of why income should be transferred to farmers, who
should receive that income, and how much should an individual farmer
receive is the central question of whether it is the land and its productivity
or the farmer and the farmer's relative wealth that matters.
This article maintains it is the land and its productivity that ultimately
matters most.68 If the land is not well-served, neither farmers nor society
will prosper. Unless one accepts the proposition that a farmer's socioeconomic status consistently determines whether the land will be farmed in an
efficiently productive and environmentally responsible manner, "targeting"
payments based on socioeconomic criteria is misplaced and is very likely to
be counterproductive.6 9

66. See, e.g., MARTY STRANGE, FAMILY FARMING: A NEW ECONCiMIC VISION 128-3 1,
262-64 (1988); Chuck Hassebrook & Marta Cleavcland, Farm Program Should be for Family
Farmers,LAND STEWARDSHIP LETTER, Winter 1994, at 15; Winston 1.Smart, The Mississippi
Christmas Tree, CHOICES, Second Quarter 1990, at 28.
67. Marty Strange argues that "[flamily farming is ...an abstraction of common
experiences and expectations, not a definitive class of farms." STRANGE, supra note 66, at
32. Nonetheless, at some point those who favor targeting payments have to define their
target as a definitive class.
68. Obviously, labor and capital are also inputs that matter. So long as farming makes
extensive use of land, however, how that land is used is likely to affect more people than are
affected by agricultural labor and capital usage. After all:
[o]f all human activity, agriculture most alters our global environment. Converting
native forest or prairie to cultivated fields entails massive and irreversible changes
in the life present. A much different ecosystem is produced, which must be
maintained artificially. Adjacent soil, water, and air are contaminated by dust,
sediments, fertilizers, animal wastes, and pesticides.
R. DON WAUCHOPE ET AL., PESTICIDES IN SURFACE AND GROUND WATER, 1-2 (Council for
Agric. Science & Tech., Issue Paper No. 2, 1994).
69. Marty Strange, whose Center for Rural Affairs favors targeting payments to small,
family farmers, asserts that "[flamily farms conserve resources because the natural, human,
and financial resources of the farm are owned by the family-they are conserved for its
heirs." STRANGE, supra note 66, at 35. Why large, family farmers would behave differently
is uncertain. More to the point, however, is this observation: "In fact, the conservation
record of family farms may be poor, but it is a cause for shame in the conscience of family
farming." Id.
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REDESIGNING THE FEDERAL FARM PROGRAMS

This article maintains that income transfers to farmers are an appropriate policy tool to compensate for market imperfections and to achieve
environmental, food, fiber, and bioenergy policy objectives that would not
be realized without economic incentives. Public investments in our food,
fiber, and bioenergy systems, however, should not be based on the financial
needs of individual farmers relative to other farmers or to other occupational
categories. In other words, income should not be transferred to small,
family farmers because they are small, family farmers. Nor should income
be transferred to farmers because, as a group, their income is less than nonfarmers, if, in fact, it is. 70 Instead, income should be transferred to farmers
based on the net public benefits farmers produce for which they are not
compensated in the market. 71 The income transferred should be measured

70. There is considerable debate over farmers' current wealth. One view is as follows:

Per capita income of farmers has exceeded per capita income of non-farmers every
year since 1986. Historically, farm income was below nonfarm income per capita
except for the unusual years of 1973 and 1974. In the future, per capita incomes
of farmers, from all sources, will be above that of non-farmers. Farm wealth is
impressive. Net worth averaged $407,186 per farm in 1991 compared with median
wealth of $78,807 for U.S. households headed by college graduates. Net worth of
commercial farms with sales of $100,000 to $250,000 averaged $751,000 in the
same year.
Luther Tweeten & Lynn Forster, Looking Forward to Choices for the 21st Century, CHOICES,
Fourth Quarter 1993, at 26, 28; see also Bruce Gardner, Demythologizing Farih Income,
CHOICES, First Quarter 1993, at 22, 23 (asserting that "the average farm household is
estimated to have 26% higher income than the nonfarm household in 1991"). Others believe
that the "average income for the two groups are roughly equal, not that farmers' income is
more than 20% greater," because the higher income attributed to farmers included receipts
of vertical integrators and other "nontraditional" farmers. Mary Ahearn, Letters: An
Exchange About "Demythologizing Farm Icome," CHOICES, Fourth Quarter 1993, at 40; see
generally MARY C. AHEARN ET AL., THE ECONOMIC WELL-BEING OF FARM OPERATOR

HOUSEHOLDS, 1988-90 (U.S. Dep't Agric., Economic Research Serv., Agric. Econ. Rep. No.
666, 1993); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, Pun. No. RCED-93-113, NET FARM INCOME:
PRIMARY EXPLANATIONS FOR THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN IRS AND USDA FIGURES (1993)

(explaining why the IRS showed net farm income in 1989 at $4.2 billion, while the USDA
reported it at $49.9 billion).
71. These payments essentially would be a form of "cost sharing." To the extent that
the payments were intended to encourage specific environmentally responsible farming
practices, the same goals arguably could be accomplished through command and control
regulations or through market mechanisms such as the "trading" of pollution control

obligations. See generally DAVID LETsON ET AL., POINT-NONPOINT SOURCE TRADING FOR
MANAGING AGRICULTURAL POLLUTANT LOADINGS (U.S. Dep't Agric., Economic Research

Serv., Agric. Econ. Rep. No. 674, 1993). This article favors cost sharing.
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by the value of those benefits, without regard to the farmer's socioeconomic
status.
In a nutshell, federal farm programs should be redesigned and
redirected with the broad goal of developing and applying efficient,
productive, and environmentally sound farm practices throughout the nation.
While the redesigned programs would provide income to participating
farmers, they would not be income maintenance programs directed to a
particular group of farmers. Any farmer, rich or poor, big or small, who
desired to work to achieve the programs' goals could participate.
In part, the redesigned programs would be technology transfer programs."
Working within relatively broad parameters established at
regional and local levels through the various USDA agencies, federal and
state agricultural experiment stations, and colleges of agriculture, the federal
government would help farmers adopt new technologies designed to promote
economically and environmentally sustainable farming systems, including
the substitution of specialized production with diversified output.73 The
programs would also wholly or partially compensate farmers for short- and
long-term economic losses incurred as a result of reducing production or
incurring other costs to achieve environmental and other policy goals.74
Under the redesigned programs, the costs of achieving economic efficiencies
and environmental goals would be shared by all of the intended beneficia-

ries.75

72. Of course, the public would be free to consider what technology it wanted based
on a number of considerations, including its effects on farm structure. See generally DON

E. ALBRECHT & STEVE H. MURDOCK, THE SOCIOLOGY OF U.S. AGRICULTURE: AN
ECOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE (1990); JACK R. KLOPPENBURG, JR., FIRST THE SEED: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PLANT BIOTECHNOLOGY 1492-2000 (1988); Neil D. Hamilton, Who

Owns Dinner: Evolving Legal Mechanisms for Ownership of Plant Genetic Resources, 28
L.J. 587 (1993); James B. Wadley, Regulating Agricultural Biotech Research: An
Introductory Perspective, 12 HAMLINE L. REV. 569 (1989); Daniel W. Bromley, Technology,
Technical Change, and Public Policy: The Need for Collective Decisions, CHOICES, Second
Quarter 1991, at 5.
73. See, e.g., ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERV., U.S. DEP'T AGRIC., AGRIC. ECON. REP.
TULSA

633, ALTERNATIVE OPPORTUNITIES IN AGRICULTURE:

EXPANDING

OUTPUT THROUGH

DIVERSIFICATION (Michael R. Dicks & Katherine C. Buckley eds., 1989).
74. See generally James S. Carpenter, Farin Chemicals, Soil Erosion, and Sustainable
Agriculture, 13 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 190, 226-34 (1994).
75. "The amount taxpayers will spend directly this year [1993] on federal farm
programs, about $17 billion, would, for example, enable us to make annual conservation
payments of fifty dollars on every acre of U.S. cropland now in cultivation." Ralph E.
Grossi, A Green Evolution: Retooling Agricultural Policy for Greater Sustainability, 48 J.
SOIL & WATER CONSERVATION 285, 287 (1993).

NORTlERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14

The development of specific practices would be decentralized, occurring
at regional or state levels, subject to national guidelines. Relatively wide
latitude would be given to those responsible for developing farming systems
to encourage experimentation. The various USDA agencies ultimately
responsible for promulgating program requirements would work closely with
state agricultural colleges, federal and state agricultural research services,
and private groups representing agricultural, environmental, and other
interests. In this way, program requirements could be tailored to address the
unique problems and needs of a particular region, whether defined by geographical or political boundaries.76 For example, an area with groundwater
problems would concentrate on developing and applying farming practices
that would address those problems.
Farmers would be paid for their compliance with specified farming
practices, including the preservation of wetlands and other environmentally
sensitive areas, the production of new crops for which markets were not
fully developed, and the adoption of alternative cropping systems. The
enrollment period would vary, depending on the specific goals of the
program. Multi-year enrollment periods would allow producers to predict
their income over a longer period than they can today and would permit
society to achieve greater, longer-term benefits.
Payment rates would ultimately reflect political considerations, as they
do today. Nonetheless, the payment rate would be based on a combination
of factors not taken into account under current farm income support
programs, including the value of expected economic benefits to society (for
example, the gains realized from the reduction of negative externalities from
pollution) discounted by any economic gains producers might realize from
increased efficiencies. While overall rates would have to be set high enough
to attract participants when the disincentives for participation were
disproportionate to the public need for participation, the payments would not
be based solely on commodity prices or farm income." The essential
determinant of payment rates would be the value the nation as a whole
receives from purchasing economically and environmentally sustainable
78
agricultural practices and food, fiber, and bioenergy systems.

76. The regions might be defined by ecosystems. See, e.g., Joan M. Comanor & Diane
Gelburd, An Ecosystem Approach to Resource Management, AGRIC. OUTLOOK, Jan.-Feb.
1994, at 18.
77. "Revenue assurance" would not be a central feature of the redesigned program.
For a discussion of such a program, one that would assure farmers of 70% of income based
on a five-year average of yield and county crop prices, see Steve Marbery, Iowa Sees Grass
Roots Support for Revenue Assurance, FEEDSTUFFS, Feb. 7, 1993, at 9.
78. Bioenergy crops may present a wholly new set of environmental considerations.
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Conceivably, there could be regional differences in payment rates, with
periodic adjustments being made in response to the need to modify program
requirements. In any case, the relative wealth of the participating farmers
would be irrelevant. For the redesigned programs, the value received by the
public would be measured in the overall economic and environmental gains
achieved by the investment of public funds. To the extent farmers
contributed to that value by incurring costs or without receiving proportionate economic returns, they would be compensated through income transfers.
C.

HOW FARMERS MANAGE LAND MATTERS

The redesigned program would be premised on the notion that the
public benefits provided by America's farmers largely flow from how they
manage the land under their control.

9

In general terms, the more produc-

tively and environmentally responsibly land is farmed, the greater the
benefits to society.8" Granted, farmers also contribute public benefits as
citizens in much the same way as non-farmers. They attend church, vote,
shop, and participate in community activities, all to the civic, social, and
economic benefit of society. Yet, the fundamental distinction between
farmers and non-farmers is farmer's control and management of two-thirds
of the nation's privately owned land.8 1 In the final analysis, what farmers
do with that land is what defines their distinct role in our society.
The public has an important stake in how land is farmed.82 The
public wants an inexpensive, plentiful, and secure food supply, produced
without unreasonable harm to the environment. While the consumer public

See generally U.S.

CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, PUB.

No. OTA-BP-E-118, POTENTIAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF BIOENERGY CROP
PRODUCTION (1993).
79. How farmers treat the land they farm has long-term ecological implications. See
generally WENDELL BERRY, THE UNSETTLING OF AMERICA (1977); WES JACKSON, NEW
ROOTS FOR AGRICULTURE (1980).
80. "[F]armers work at the junction where population, the human condition, and
sparing land for Nature meet." COUNCIL FOR AGRIC. SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY, TASK FORCE
REP. No. 121, How MUCH LAND CAN TEN BILLION PEOPLE SPARE FOR NATURE? 3 (1994).
81. In 1988, 2.9 million farmland owners, less than two percent of the nation's
population, owned two-thirds of the nation's private land. DENISE ROGERS & GENE
WUNDERLICH,

ACQUIRING FARMLAND IN THE UNITED STATES

Economic Research Serv., Agric. Info. Bull. No. 682, 1993).

82.

4 (U.S. Dep't Agric.,

See generally NATIONAL RES. COUNCIL, SOIL AND WATER QUALITY: AN AGENDA

(1993); R. NEIL SAMPSON, FARMLAND OR WASTELAND: A TIME TO
CHOOSE, OVERCOMING THE THREAT TO AMERICA'S FARM AND FOOD FUTURE (1981); MAX
SCHNEPF, SOIL CONSERVATION SOCIETY OF AMERICA, FARMLAND, FOOD AND THE FUTURE
FOR AGRICULTURE

(1979).
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compensates farmers for the food farmers produce, the price of agricultural
commodities does not include all of the costs imposed on the public by
environmentally harmful farming practices. Nor do commodity prices
consistently provide sufficient returns to allow farmers to invest in new
technologies that would allow more efficient and environmentally responsible commodity production. Even when the commodity and the commodity's
producer is supported by federal farm price and income supports, those
mechanisms do not reflect either the environmental costs of producing the
83
commodity or the cost of implementing new technologies. In fact, price
supports may not even reflect all the costs of production."
If federal farm programs are to be relevant, they must reflect the
current realities of farmland ownership and farming operations. To deliver
what the public wants, farmers have to farm as efficiently as possible,
achieving economies of scale whenever possible. Lacking the ability to
consistently eliminate the economic and biological risks inherent in
agricultural production, farmers often seek to spread the risks by acquiring
more land and by diversifying their farm and non-farm income sources. For
a variety of reasons, including inheritances, federal farm program payments,
fortuitous weather, favorable markets, management skills, and other factors,
some farmers have prospered more than others.

83. While income support is primarily accomplished through deficiency payments,
price support is primarily accomplished through nonrecourse loans for which participating
producers pledge their crops as collateral. Crops eligible for nonrecourse loans include rice,
feed grains, peanuts, dairy products, oilseeds, upland cotton, and wheat. See 7 U.S.C. §§
1441-2(a), 1444f(a), 1445c-3, 1446a, 1446f, 1444-2(a), 1445b-3a(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
The loan period is normally nine months. The producer has the option of repaying the loan
at the loan rate or forfeiting the crop without government recourse. Because program
participants can always receive the loan price no matter how low the market price falls, the
nonrecourse loan program effectively establishes the minimum price for the commodity. See
generally M. C. HALLBERG, POLICY FOR AMERICAN AGRICULTURE:
QUENCES 25-26 (1992).

CHOICES AND CONSE-

High loan rates increase prices of supported commodities, thus lowering deficiency
payments. As a result, fewer farmers participate in the deficiency payment program,
particularly if the acreage reduction requirement is high. High loan rates also reduce export
sales because of the increase in price. JAMES LANGLEY ET AL., FARM PROGRAM TOOLS:
TRADEOFFS AND INTERACTIONS 4 (U.S. Dep't Agric., Economic Research Serv., Agric. Info.
Bull. No. 521, 1987); see also CLARK EDWARDS, CROPS, LIVESTOCK, AND FARM PROGRAMS:
OVERLOOKED INTERACTIONS (U.S. Dep't Agric., Economic Research Serv., Agric. Economic
Report No. 638, 1990) (discussing the economic impacts of target prices and acreage reduction programs).
84. See generally MARY AHEARN ET AL., How COSTS OF PRODUCTION VARY (U.S.
Dep't Agric., Economic Research Serv., Agric. Info. Bull. No. 599, 1990).
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As some farmers have prospered while others have not, farmland
ownership has become increasingly concentrated. Forty-seven percent of the
nation's farmland is owned by four percent of farmland owners. Sixty-nine
percent of all farmland, however, is owned by individuals and families. The
remaining owners are combinations of partnerships, corporations, and other
entities, and a recent USDA survey found that these "partnerships may
include family members, and a large majority of [the] corporations are
family-held." 85
Production has also become more concentrated. That concentration,
however, has not been uniform across all commodity groups because the
trend toward concentration is influenced by a variety of factors, including
the same factors that favor vertical integration. These factors include
"perishability, seasonality of production, resource requirements, degree of
processing required, and the nature of the final demand for the commodi86
ty."
The concentration of production in program commodities is not
uniformly as great as it is for products such as fruits, vegetables, hogs, and
poultry. For example, nearly one-half of all income transfers to farmers go
to cash grain farmers.8 7 While the trend is toward fewer and larger cash
grain farms because the production of most grain crops use a lot of land and
little labor, cash grain production is still concentrated on small- and
moderate-sized farms.88 In 1987, only 25.3% of all cash grain and field
crop farms produced one-half of all cash grain and field crop sales in

85. ROGERS & WUNDERLICH, supra note 81, at 8. A recent study drew the following
conclusions:
Farmland owners now outnumber operators;
Farmland ownership continues to concentrate;
The landlord-tenant power balance has tipped toward the tenant;
Landlords have given way to landladies;
Half of U.S. farm landlords reside outside their community;
Owners and renters share management decisions; land]
Farmland is increasingly owned by non-farmers.
Gene Wunderlich, U.S. Fanniiand Ownership: A CentluY of Change, AGRIC. OUTLOOK, Dec.
1993, at 3-4.
86. DONN A. REIMUND & FRED GALE, STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN TiE U.S. FARM
13Tit ANNUAL FAMILY FARM REPORT TO CONGRESS 14 (U.S. Dep't

SECTOR, 1974-87:

Agrie., Economic Research Serv., Agric. Info. Bull. No. 647, 1992).
87. From 1985 through 1988, "cash grain farms represented close to half of all
participating farms, and they also received over half of all payments." FARMING AND FARM
PROGRAMS, supra note 47. at 13.
88. REIMUND & GALE, stqra note 86, at 14 ("The cash grain subsector comes very
close to the way most people think of agriculture.").
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1987.89 For cotton, another major program crop, "the trend to fewer and
larger cotton farms appears to have ended.' 9 In 1987, however, the largest
9
number of cotton farms were in the $100,000 to $250,000 sales class. '
With acreage averaging 202 acres per farm in 1987, rice production is
dominated by large producers. Only twenty-seven percent of all rice farms
harvested more than 250 acres, but that harvest accounted for almost sixty
percent. of the crop.92
These levels of concentration are in marked contrast to the concentration in other sectors not supported by program payments. For example, the
largest one percent of farms producing eggs have sixty percent of the laying
hens. It is also much lower than the overall concentration in farm
production where, in 1987, only 3.6% of all farms produced one-half of all
farm output.93 Also, the concentration levels reveal only so much. Using

a measure known as the Gini coefficient to make comparisons of production
concentration between corn producers and broiler producers based on corn
acreage and broiler sales, the USDA determined that corn and broilers had
roughly equal concentration ratios. Despite the rough equality in concentration ratios, "corn and broilers are starkly different industries. Most poultry
farms produce broilers under contract to large processing companies who
play a major role in determining farm size and management. In contrast,
corn farmers produce relatively little corn under contract and control most
of their management decisions."94
Although farmland remains predominantly in individual and family
ownership, the concentration of wealth in rural communities presents many
of the same public policy issues that arise out of the disproportionate
allocation of wealth throughout society. 95 The concentration of farmland

89. Id. at 16.
90. HAROLD STULTS ET AL., COTrON: BACKGROUND FOR 1990 FARM LEGISLATION
3 (1989).
91. Id. at 6.
92. C. EDWIN YOUNG ET AL., FOOD GRAINS: BACKGROUND FOR 1990 FARM
LEGISLATION 73 (U.S. Dep't Agric., Economic Research Serv., Agric. Info. Bull. No. 602,
1990).
93. R. NEAL PETERSON & NORA L. BROOKS, THE CHANGING CONCENTRATION OF U.S.

AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION DURING THE 20TH CENTURY: 14TH ANNUAL REPORT TO THE
CONGRESS ON THE STATUS OF TIlE FAMILY FARM 4, 12 (U.S. Dep't Agric., Economic

Research Serv., Agric. Info. Bull. No. 671, 1993).
94. Id. at 9.
95. See generally THOMAS A. CARLIN & BERNAL L. GREEN, LOCAL FARM STRUCTURE
AND COMMUNITY TIES (U.S. Dep't Agric., Economic Research Serv., Rural Development
Res. Rep. No. 68, 1988).
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ownership has also contributed to the de-population of rural America.9
Thus, society has lost some of the benefits of an economically diverse, wellpopulated rural sector. Finally, the concentration of farm enterprises also
suggests that farmers might someday have sufficient market power to raise
commodity prices to the disadvantage of consumers and sector's international competitiveness, although for the crops supported by the federal farm
programs that prospect may be more theoretical than real in the foreseeable
future. 97

D.

THE'PROBLEM WITH "TARGETING" PAYMENTS

Even when the concentration of farmland ownership and agricultural
production is recognized as presenting public policy issues, however, the use
of farmland remains a central determinant of the public benefits or losses
derived from farming. Thus, targeting program payments to farmers based
on the small size of their farms or their relative or absolute financial need
diminishes the ability of that public investment to influence how most of the
land devoted to program commodities is used. Moreover, it is not altogether
certain that federal farm programs have contributed to that concentration,
"very little is now known about how farm programs relate to the size
distribution [of farms]. Although there are views on all sides of the
question, a reasonable assessment is that commodity programs are roughly
neutral with respect to farm size distributions, both within and across
commodity programs." 98
Nor is it certain that directing program payments to small, family
farmers or financially distressed farms would significantly restructure
American agriculture in a favorable way. For example, reducing payment
limits could result in the following consequences:
If smaller payment limits reduced participation rates of farms
producing a significant share of output, they would thwart Acreage
Reduction Programs and thereby fail to raise prices to the whole

96. For an excellent discussion of the various factors contributing to the de-population

of the rural South, see generally JACK T. KIRBY, RURAL WORLDS LOST:

SOUTH 1920-1960 (1987).
97. Sumner, supra note 46, at 131.

THE AMERICAN

98. Id. at 150; see generally DAVID L. DEBERTIN & CRAIG L. INFANGER, TARGETING

FEDERAL FARM PROGRAMS: OPTIONS AND CONSEQUENCES (University of Ky., Dep't of

Agric. Econ., Staff Paper No. 229, 1987); ROBERT REINSEL ET AL., REDISTRIBUTING FARM

PROGRAM BENEFITS (U.S. Dep't Agric., Economic Research Serv., Agric. Info. Bull. No.
522, 1987); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No. RCED-87-144, FARM PROGRAMS:
ANALYSIS OF OPTIONS FOR TARGETING PAYMENTS AND CROP LOANS (1987).
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industry, participants and non-participahts alike. Further if significant numbers of producers received lower payments (perhaps zero),
the total farm sector income would fall and farm asset values,
especially land values, also would fall. Finally, if targeting shifted
policy-induced size distributions so that higher-cost producers of
program commodities produced a larger share of the total, the
competitive position of the United States in world markets would be
reduced and costs to U.S. consumers would be raised."
Simply put, federal farm programs should not have the functions and
attributes of welfare programs for three reasons. First, the public benefits
derived from supporting a group of farmers defined by their farm size or
financial need are significantly less than could be derived from supporting
any farmer who wanted to contribute public benefits through the current
programs or this article's proposed, redesigned programs. Second, attempts
to target program payments to an economically defined class of farmers are
likely to create as many inequities as they propose to solve. Third, such
attempts make income transfers to farmers even more vulnerable to
extinction.
Theoretically, targeting payments to producers in financial distress
presents several significant problems under the current programs:
First, paying more to those with financial losses rewards farms for
poor management or excessive risk taking. Allowing higher
payments to farms with more debt or negative cash flow would
effectively penalize otherwise similar farms that are more efficient
and prudent. Second, using, relatively arbitrary debt, income, or
similar criteria for targeting will cause farms to adjust their income
statements or balance sheets to be included in the favored status.
Third, it is exceedingly difficult to devise criteria that would provide
significant help to keep favored farms solvent without inadvertently
missing other equally deserving farms or inadvertently including
Fourth, [other sorts
farms that were not meant to be targeted ....
programs]
Administration
of programs, such as the Farmers Home
seem more suited to providing assistance to farms with troubled
financial situations."
When assessing the merits of targeting program payments, examining
what Congress has actually done to target payments may be a better gauge

99. Sumner, supra note 46, at 139-40.
100. Id. at 149-50.
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of results than assessing "theoretical" problems. Since 1988, applicants for
federal disaster assistance payments have been "means tested" under a
"qualifying gross revenues" standard.' 0 ' If an applicant's "qualifying
gross
revenues" exceed $2 million, payments are denied. As expressed by Senator
Leahy, disaster assistance payments were "means tested" to target payments
toward "those who need it most. It will help family farmers, not giant
agribusinesses and the Crown Prince of Liechtenstein."' 2 Notwithstanding
Senator Leahy's assurances, the "qualifying gross revenues" test enacted by
Congress and implemented by the Secretary of Agriculture does absolutely
nothing to target payments to those who need it most or to family farmers.
Under the test implemented by the Secretary of Agriculture, two steps
are required to determine whether an applicant's "qualifying gross revenues"
exceed $2 million. First, a comparison is made between the applicant's
"gross annual income" from farming and the applicant's "gross annual
income" from non-farm sources in the most recent tax year before the
disaster. If the majority of the applicant's "annual gross income" was
derived from farming, then the applicant's "qualifying gross revenues" will
be limited to the gross revenues realized from farming. If less than a
majority of the applicant's "annual gross income" came from farming, the
applicant's "qualifying gross revenues" will be all of the applicant's gross
revenues from farm and non-farm sources. 0 3 In making this comparison,
only gross receipts are compared; there is no "netting" of any kind, not even
for direct costs of production or the acquisition costs of inventory. Also, the
applicant will be "combined" with any non-farm corporation or similar entity
in which the applicant holds a majority interest." 4 Once such a combination occurs, all of the corporation's annual gross income is included in the
applicant's annual gross income from non-farm sources. The second step
of the calculation is determining whether the applicant's "qualifying gross
revenues" exceed $2 million.
As implemented by the Secretary, the "qualifying gross revenues" test
does not consider in any way whether the applicant realized any profit from
farming and non-farming operations. Thus, the standard completely ignores

101. 7 U.S.C. § 1421 n.231 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
102. 134 CONG. REc. SI 1,027 (daily ed. Aug. 8,1988).
103. 7 C.F.R. § 1477.3 (1994) (qualifying gross revenues). The Secretary's definition
of "qualifying gross revenues" has withstood challenges based on its inconsistency with the
statute. See Vculek v. Yeutter, 754 F. Supp. 154 (D.N.D. 1990), of d per curiam sub. non.,
Vculek v. Madigan, 950 F.2d 727 (8th Cir. 1991); Haubein Farms, Inc. v. Department of

Agriculture, 824 F. Supp. 239 (D.D.C. 1993); Doane v. Espy, No. 91-C-852-C (W.D. Wis.
July 20, 1993), rev'd on other grounds, 26 F.3d 783 (7th Cir. 1994).
104. See 7 C.F.R. § 1477.3 (1994) (person).
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whether the farmer has the financial means to provide for his or her
livelihood. Consider this example: a farmer has suffered a total crop loss
because of last summer's floods in the Midwest. In the preceding year, the
farmer's annual gross revenues from farming were well under $2 million,
producing a "profit" (or funds left over after paying expenses) of $30,000.
The farmer was the majority owner of a non-farm retail business with large
gross sales relative to capital and earnings. It realized gross revenues
exceeding $2 million but paid no dividends or distributions to its owners
because it suffered a net operating loss. That farmer, who is facing the loss
of all farm income because of a disaster, would not be eligible for crop
disaster assistance. In other words, unless the off-farm business produced
earnings during the year of the disaster, the farmer would have to live on
what was left over from the $30,000 farm "profit" earned in the preceding
year.
"Means tests" and payment limitations do not advance the supply
control and environmental goals of the current farm programs. To the
contrary, they work at cross-purposes to the supply control and environmental purposes of the current programs because they are barriers to program
participation erected without regard to a producer's ability to influence
5
commodity supplies or environmental quality."' The only purpose served
by means testing and payment limitations is political. As political devices,
means tests and payment limitations occupy powerful positions. They are
mediators in the debate between those who support income transfers to
farmers and those who oppose them. They are also used by those who seek
to favor some farmers over others. The most ardent critics of the current
payment limitations rules include small, family farm advocates who want to

105. See Carole F. Nuckton, Farmi Program Conflicts: The $50,000 Case, CIotCES,
Fourth Quarter 1989, at 34, 35. The payment limitation rules are also inefficient:
Eliminating the payment limitation would mean considerable savings in program
administration costs, by simplifying and streamlining the system. Supply control
could operate more effectively. County offices of the Agricultural Conservation
and Stabilization Service would no longer have to judge the legitimacy of their
neighbor's reorganization plans. And without the payment limits, farmers would
save the large fees paid to third parties.
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see the limits made more restrictive."' 6 In this respect, they are allied with
those who want to reduce or abolish deficiency payments altogether.
One of the ironies of means tests and payment limitations is that
making them more restrictive does not ensure public support for farm
programs. Redirecting or "targeting" payments based on farmer wealth or
farm size are just as likely to work against the continuation of income
transfers to all farmers. Means tests and payment limitations underscore the
"welfare" aspects of the programs and reduce the number
of program
participants either by disqualifying applicants or reducing the programs'
attractiveness. In other words, they change the character of the programs
and reduce the programs' constituency. As the favored group becomes
smaller and increasingly distinguished from other groups by its financial
need, all other justifications for the programs evaporate. The only defense
for the programs is the financial need of the recipients, and such a defense
requires constant assertions of the inherent value or worthiness of the
targeted group. The programs lose the ability to attract the support once
derived from their environmental and more broadly-based supply control and
income stabilization functions.
Premising the federal farm programs on the public's willingness to
permanently or temporarily support a group defined by its financial need is
a dubious strategy. Even casting the favored group as "family farmers"
offers no guarantees. Certainly, the idealized agrarian image of American
agriculture still has force. Many Americans, however, are beginning to view
farming as just another business, with farmers having advantages not shared
by other Americans, such as landownership and a perceived independence.
III.

CONCLUSION

Now is the time to begin rethinking the equities of the federal farm
programs and to begin redesigning the programs' purposes. If current trends
toward narrowing program eligibility based on participants' relative wealth
106. The basis of the argument is set forth in

DON PAARLBERG, FARM AND FOOD

POLICY: ISSUES OF THE 1980's 37-38 (1980). Professor Paarlberg summarizes the claim that
the programs are inequitable as follows:
What the American people have difficulty accepting, when they are made aware
of it, is reverse transfers of income, from the poorer to the more wealthy,
particularly if this is achieved through the exercise of power and with the help of
government. Government was created to protect the general interest from the
special interest; there is disrespect for government if that fundamental role is
reversed. Demonstrably, that is what has now happened with the big commodity
programs.

Id. at 37.
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continue,"0 7 the programs will soon exist only for an ever-decreasing group
of relatively small and less wealthy farmers. As such, the political,
economic, and environmental arguments for the programs' long-term
continuation will become less convincing and less likely to prevail in the
debate over the allocation of limited federal funds. To the degree that the
targeted group represents a minority of America's farmers defined by their
relative wealth, the programs become more transparently special interest
legislation.
Neither means testing nor payment limitations would be a part of this
article's proposed, redesigned programs. So long as the general public
benefitted from a productive, sustainable agricultural system in proportion
to its investment in that system, farmers would not be denied the opportunity to participate based on their socioeconomic status. By paying for the
adoption and maintenance of economically efficient and environmentally
responsible farming practices, the "safety net" offered by the redesigned
programs would extend to the American public as a whole. It would ensure
the nation maintained food, security and competitiveness in international
markets while sharing the costs of technology, adoption and environmental
protection.

107. The Clinton administration has proposed denying payments to persons with offfarm incomes of $100,000 or more. If enacted into law, the new limit would deny payments
to about 7,000 of the farm operator households receiving deficiency payments in 1991, about
2% of all recipients. Those "households accounted for 2.3% of the total deficiency payments
made in 1991," and they were "more likely to specialize in cotton and other crops." Mary
Ahearn & Janet Perry, Change Proposed for Farin Payment Limits, AGRIC. OUTLOOK, Apr.
1993, at 25, 27.

